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This online appendix contains the derivation of the closed form solutions for the examples used in
the main paper. It establishes the result stated in Section 4.3 of the main paper, that Proposition 4
continues to hold even if the price is endogenous and there are production costs. It provides the proofs
of some results stated in the extensions section of the paper. It also details the numerical analysis
performed to check the robustness of the first part of Corollary 1 to the introduction of private benefits
and spillovers.
1 Linear example
We directly conduct the calculations for the linear example with N > 1 agents and spillovers, i.e.
where the revenue generated by agent i is
Ri = θai + x (a−i − ai) + γei + δI
and fixed costs are
cai (a) =
1
2
a2, cei (e) =
1
2
e2 and cI (I) =
1
2
I2. (1)
The results for the case N = 1 are then simply derived by setting x = 0 and N = 1.
Consider first the E-mode. The payoff to agent i from working for the firm is
(1− t)Ri − 1
2
e2i − T = (1− t) (θai + x (a−i − ai) + γei + δI)−
1
2
e2i − T,
which implies that the level of effort chosen by each agent in the second stage is
eE (t) = γ (1− t) .
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In E-mode, the firm sets a1, ..., aN and I to maximize its second stage revenues (wages are paid in
the first stage):
N∑
i=1
(
t (θai + x (a−i − ai) + γei + δI)− 1
2
a2i
)
− 1
2
I2,
implying the firm’s optimal choices are
aE (t) = θt
IE (t) = Nδt.
The fixed fee T is set to render each agent indifferent between working for the firm and her outside
option, so the expression of E-mode profits as a function of t is
N
2
((
θ2 +Nδ2
)
t (2− t) + γ2 (1− t2)) . (2)
Maximizing (2) with respect to t implies the optimal variable fee in E-mode is
tE∗ =
θ2 +Nδ2
θ2 + γ2 +Nδ2
,
which is positive but smaller than 1. With this optimal variable fee, the resulting profits in E-mode
are
ΠE∗ =
N
2
(
θ2 +Nδ2 +
γ4
θ2 + γ2 +Nδ2
)
. (3)
Consider next the P -mode. The payoff to an individual agent joining the platform is
(1− t) (θai + x (a−i − ai) + γei + δI)− 1
2
a2i −
1
2
e2i − T.
Individual agents maximize their second stage payoff by choosing
eP (t) = γ (1− t)
aP (t) = (θ − x) (1− t) .
The firm’s second stage profits in P -mode are
N∑
i=1
t (θai + x (a−i − ai) + γei + δI)− 1
2
I2,
2
which the firm maximizes over I, leading to
IP (t) = Nδt.
Stepping back to the first stage, the firm sets T to equalize the agents’ net payoff to their outside
option. Total firm profit in P -mode as a function of t is then
N
2
(
(θ − x) (1− t) (θ + x+ (θ − x) t) + γ2 (1− t2)+Nδ2t (2− t)) . (4)
The optimal variable fee is
tP∗ =
Nδ2 − x (θ − x)
(θ − x)2 + γ2 +Nδ2 .
Resulting profits in P -mode are
ΠP∗ =
N
2
(
θ2 − x2 + γ2 +
(
Nδ2 − x (θ − x))2
(θ − x)2 + γ2 +Nδ2
)
. (5)
Comparing (3) with (5), the P -mode is preferred if and only if
γ2 +
(
Nδ2 − x (θ − x))2
(θ − x)2 + γ2 +Nδ2 > Nδ
2 + x2 +
γ4
θ2 + γ2 +Nδ2
.
If there are no spillovers, i.e. x = 0, then this condition simplifies to
γ2 > Nδ2.
For x 6= 0, the condition can be re-written
(
γ2x
θ
+ θ2 +Nδ2
)2
≤ θ2 (θ2 + γ2 +Nδ2)+ γ4
or
θ
γ2
(
− (θ2 +Nδ2)−√θ2 (θ2 + γ2 +Nδ2) + γ4) ≤ x ≤ θ
γ2
(
− (θ2 +Nδ2)+√θ2 (θ2 + γ2 +Nδ2) + γ4) .
Finally, let us determine the effects of γ and δ on the tradeoff between the two modes. To do so,
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we apply the envelope theorem to expressions (2) and (4) and obtain
dΠE∗
d (γ2)
=
N
2
(
1− (tE∗)2) and dΠE∗
d (Nδ2)
=
N
2
tE∗
(
2− tE∗)
dΠP∗
d (γ2)
=
N
2
(
1− (tP∗)2) and dΠP∗
d (Nδ2)
=
N
2
tP∗
(
2− tP∗) .
Since 0 < tE∗, tP∗ < 1 and t (2− t) is increasing in t for t ∈ [0, 1], we conclude that
d
(
ΠP∗ −ΠE∗)
d (γ2)
> 0 if and only if tE∗ > tP∗
d
(
ΠE∗ −ΠP∗)
d (Nδ2)
> 0 if and only if tE∗ > tP∗.
2 Linear example: endogenous price and production costs
We now extend the linear example from the previous section with x = 0 and N = 1, by allowing
the firm to also set a price in the contracting stage, along with the fees (t, T ), and by also adding a
production cost. We will establish the result stated at the end of Section 4.3 in the main paper, i.e.
that Proposition 4 continues to hold in this case.
The revenue generated by the agent is now
R (p, a, e, I) = (p− d) (D0 + θa+ γe+ δI − p) ,
where d ≥ 0 is a constant marginal production cost, p is the price chosen by the firm and D0 is some
baseline level of demand. Fixed costs are still quadratic
ca (a) =
1
2
a2, ce (e) =
1
2
e2 and cI (I) =
1
2
I2.
First, we show that whether the production cost is incurred by the firm or the agent does not
affect profits in either mode. In E-mode, if the firm incurs the production cost, then the maximization
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problem is
Π˜E∗ = max
p,t,a,e,I
{
(p− d) (D0 + θa+ γe+ δI − p)− 1
2
a2 − 1
2
e2 − 1
2
I2
}
s.t.
(tp− d) θ = a
(1− t) γp = e
(tp− d) δ = I.
If instead the agent incurs the production cost, then the maximization problem is
Π˜E∗ = max
p,t˜,a,e,I
{
(p− d) (D0 + θa+ γe+ δI − p)− 1
2
a2 − 1
2
e2 − 1
2
I2
}
s.t.
t˜pθ = a((
1− t˜) p− d) γ = e
t˜pδ = I.
By making the change of variables t˜ ≡ t− dp , the second maximization problem becomes the same as
the first.
Similarly, in P -mode, if the firm incurs the production cost, then the maximization problem is
Π˜P∗ = max
p,t,a,e,I
{
(p− d) (D0 + θa+ γe+ δI − p)− 1
2
a2 − 1
2
e2 − 1
2
I2
}
s.t.
(1− t) pθ = a
(1− t) pγ = e
(tp− d) δ = I.
If instead the agent incurs the production cost, then the maximization problem is
Π˜P∗ = max
p,t˜,a,e,I
{
(p− d) (D0 + θa+ γe+ δI − p)− 1
2
a2 − 1
2
e2 − 1
2
I2
}
s.t.
((
1− t˜) p− d) θ = a((
1− t˜) p− d) γ = e
t˜pδ = I.
Again, by making the change of variables t˜ = t − dp , the second maximization problem becomes the
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same as the first. Thus, in our setting it is irrelevant which party actually incurs the production cost.
Solving the program above in E-mode, we obtain
Π˜E∗ = max
p,t
{
(p− d) (D0 − p) + θ
2 + δ2
2
(tp− d) ((2− t) p− d) + γ
2
2
p (1− t) (p (1 + t)− 2d)
}
.
Holding p fixed and optimizing over t, we obtain
tE∗ (p) =
(
θ2 + δ2
)
p+ γ2d
(θ2 + δ2 + γ2) p
.
Substituting this back into Π˜E∗, the program becomes
Π˜E∗ = max
p
{
(p− d) (D0 − p) + (p− d)2 ΠE∗
}
,
where ΠE∗ is given by (3) with x = 0 and N = 1. Similarly, solving the program above in P -mode,
we have
Π˜P∗ = max
p,t
{
(p− d) (D0 − p) + δ
2
2
(tp− d) ((2− t) p− d) + θ
2 + γ2
2
p (1− t) (p (1 + t)− 2d)
}
.
Holding p fixed and optimizing over t, we obtain
tP∗ (p) =
δ2p+
(
θ2 + γ2
)
d
(θ2 + δ2 + γ2) p
.
Substituting this back into Π˜P∗, the program becomes
Π˜P∗ = max
p
{
(p− d) (D0 − p) + (p− d)2 ΠP∗
}
,
where ΠP∗ is given by (5) with x = 0 and N = 1.
Comparing the last expressions of Π˜P∗ and Π˜E∗, we can conclude that
Π˜P∗ > Π˜E∗ ⇐⇒ ΠP∗ > ΠE∗ ⇐⇒ γ > δ,
so the introduction of p and d does not affect the trade-off determined in Proposition 4 in the main
paper.
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3 Private benefits (N = 1)
Revenue is R (a, e, I). The firm derives private benefits Y (a), whereas the agent derives private benefits
y (a). We can state an extended version of Proposition 3 in the main paper.
Proposition 1 Suppose R (a, e, I) is supermodular in its arguments, Y (a) = Y a and y (a) = ya,
where Y and y are positive constants. Then: (i) if Y > y and tP∗ ≥ 1/2, then ΠE∗ > ΠP∗; (ii) if
y > Y and tE∗ ≤ 1/2, then ΠP∗ > ΠE∗.
Proof. For any (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4) ∈ [0, 1]4, let
Π (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4) ≡ R (a, e, I) + (Y + y) a− ca (a)− ce (e)− cI (I) ,
where (a, e, I) is the unique solution to the three equations
τ1Ra (a, e, I) + τ2 (Y + y) = c
a
a (a) (6)
τ3Re (a, e, I) = c
e
e (e)
τ4RI (a, e, I) = c
I
I (I) .
We first prove two preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 1 For all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the solution (a, e, I) to (6) is strictly increasing in τi.
Proof. Note that the solution (a, e, I) corresponds to a game in which there are three players, which
seek to maximize respectively
f1 (a) ≡ τ1R (a, e, I) + τ2 (Y + y) a− ca (a)
f2 (e) ≡ τ3R (a, e, I)− ce (e)
f3 (I) ≡ τ4R (a, e, I)− cI (I) .
Since R is supermodular, it is easily seen that the game is supermodular with payoffs having strictly
increasing differences in the actions (a, e, I) and the parameters (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4). From standard super-
modularity results1, we know that an increase in any of the parameters (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4) will increase
each of the solutions (a, e, I) in a weak sense. To obtain the strict comparative static result, note that
the solution is defined by the set of equations defined in (6). This means that if τi increases for some
1See, for instance, X. Vives (1999), Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
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i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and a, e or I does not strictly increase, then neither a, e and I can change since none
can decrease. But if (a, e, I) all remain unchanged, then, since τi is higher, the first-order conditions
(6) can no longer hold. Thus, at least one among (a, e, I) must strictly increase.
Lemma 2 When (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4) ∈ [0, 1)4, the payoff function Π (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4) is strictly increasing in τi
for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Proof. We have
dΠ
dτ1
= (Ra (a, e, I) + Y + y − caa (a))
da
dτ1
+ (Re (a, e, I)− cee (e))
de
dτ1
+
(
RI (a, e, I)− cII (I)
) dI
dτ1
= ((1− τ1)Ra (a, e, I) + (1− τ2) (Y + y)) da
dτ1
+ (1− τ3)Re (a, e, I) de
dτ1
+ (1− τ3)RI (a, e, I) dI
dτ1
,
where we have used (6) to replace caa (a), c
e
e (e) and c
I
I (I). By assumption, Ra > 0, Re > 0 and RI > 0,
and from Lemma 1, we know that dadτ1 ≥ 0, dedτ1 ≥ 0 and dIdτ1 ≥ 0, with at least one strict inequality.
Thus, we can conclude that dΠdτ1 > 0 when (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4) ∈ [0, 1)4.
A very similar reasoning proves that dΠdτi > 0 for i = 2, 3, 4 when (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4) ∈ [0, 1)4.
We can now use these lemmas to prove Proposition 1.
Suppose y > Y and tE∗ ≤ 1/2. Then the firm could strictly improve on E-mode profits ΠE∗ by
giving up control over the transferable action a to the agent and keeping the variable fee unchanged,
equal to tE∗. To see this, note that the change in profits is
Π
(
1− tE∗, y
Y + y
, 1− tE∗, tE∗
)
−Π
(
tE∗,
Y
Y + y
, 1− tE∗, tE∗
)
.
If tE∗ > 0, then this difference is positive by Lemma 2, because 0 < tE∗ < 1/2 and y > Y imply(
tE∗, YY+y , 1− tE∗, tE∗
)
∈ (0, 1)4 and
(
1− tE∗, yY+y , 1− tE∗, tE∗
)
>
(
tE∗, YY+y , 1− tE∗, tE∗
)
. If tE∗ =
0, then the change in profits is
Π
(
1,
y
Y + y
, 1, 0
)
−Π
(
0,
Y
Y + y
, 1, 0
)
=
(
max
a,e
{R (a, e, 0) + (Y + y) a− ca (a)− ce (e)} s.t. Ra (a, e, I) + y = caa (a)
)
−max
e
{R (0, e, 0)− ce (e)} ,
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which is positive due to assumptions (a1)-(a4).
Thus, in all cases we have
ΠE∗ = Π
(
tE∗,
Y
Y + y
, 1− tE∗, tE∗
)
< Π
(
1− tE∗, y
Y + y
, 1− tE∗, tE∗
)
≤ ΠP∗.
Similarly, denote by tP∗ the optimal transaction fee in E-mode and suppose tP∗ > 1/2 and Y > y.
Then the firm could strictly improve on P -mode profits by taking control over the transferable action
a and keeping the variable fee unchanged, equal to tP∗. To see this, note that the change in profits is
Π
(
tP∗,
Y
Y + y
, 1− tP∗, tP∗
)
−Π
(
1− tP∗, y
Y + y
, 1− tP∗, tP∗
)
.
If tP∗ < 1, then this difference is positive by Lemma 2, because 1 > tP∗ > 1/2 and Y > y implies(
1− tP∗, yY+y , 1− tP∗, tP∗
)
∈ (0, 1)4 and
(
tP∗, YY+y , 1− tP∗, tP∗
)
>
(
1− tP∗, yY+y , 1− tP∗, tP∗
)
. If
tP∗ = 1, then the change in profits is
Π
(
1,
Y
Y + y
, 0, 1
)
−Π
(
0,
y
Y + y
, 0, 1
)
=
(
max
a,I
{
R (a, 0, I) + (Y + y) a− ca (a)− cI (I)} s.t. Ra (a, e, I) + Y = caa (a))
−max
I
{
R (0, 0, I)− cI (I)} ,
which is positive due to assumptions (a1)-(a4).
Thus, in all cases we have
ΠP∗ = Π
(
1− tP∗, y
Y + y
, 1− tP∗, tP∗
)
< Π
(
tP∗,
Y
Y + y
, 1− tP∗, tP∗
)
= ΠE∗.
The claim of Proposition 1 says that when the transferable action has a higher impact on the firm’s
private benefits relative to the agent’s, the firm would never find it profitable to function in P -mode
and charge variable fees above 50%. Similarly, when the transferable action has a higher impact on
the agent’s private benefits relative to the firm’s, the firm would never find it profitable to function in
E-mode and pay a bonus above 50%.
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This can be re-stated in a more empirically useful way. To do so, define
t∗ ≡
 tE∗ if ΠE∗ ≥ ΠP∗tP∗ if ΠE∗ < ΠP∗,
which is the optimal variable fee charged by the firm in the optimal mode. We obtain the following
extension of Corollary 1 in the main paper.
Corollary 1 Suppose R (a, e, I) is supermodular in its arguments, Y (a) = Y a and y (a) = ya, where
Y and y are positive constants. If y > Y and t∗ ≤ 1/2, then the P -mode is optimal. If Y > y and
t∗ ≥ 1/2, then the E-mode is optimal.
Thus, if the agent obtains more than 50% of variable revenues and the agent’s private benefits are
more important, then the firm should be functioning in P -mode, and not in E-mode. This suggests
(as in Corollary 1 in the main paper), that only observing whether agents keep more or less than
50% of variable revenue can reveal the mode under which a firm is operating. However, the result
requires that the party receiving more than 50% of variable revenue also has the more important
private benefits. In Section 7 below we show numerically that even if this is not the case, knowing
whether agents receive more or less than 50% of variable revenues still allows us to correctly predict
the choice of mode most of the time.
3.1 Linear revenue function and linear private benefits
Again, we resort to the example with linear revenue function and quadratic cost functions:
R (a, e, I) = θa+ γe+ δI
ca (a) =
1
2
a2, ce (e) =
1
2
e2, cI (I) =
1
2
I2.
Private benefits are also assumed to be linear:
Y (a) = Y a and y (a) = ya,
where Y , y > 0.
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In E-mode, the firm solves
ΠE∗ = max
t,a,e,I
{
(θ + Y + y) a+ γe+ δI − 1
2
a2 − 1
2
e2 − 1
2
I2
}
subject to
tθ + Y = a
(1− t) γ = e
tδ = I
Straightforward calculations yield
ΠE∗ = max
t
{
1
2
(
(tθ + Y ) ((2− t) θ + Y + 2y) + δ2t (2− t) + γ2 (1− t2))}
= max
t
{
1
2
(
2 (θ + Y + y) (tθ + Y )− (tθ + Y )2 + δ2t (2− t) + γ2 (1− t2))} ,
which leads to
tE∗ =
θ2 + θy + δ2
θ2 + δ2 + γ2
ΠE∗ =
1
2
(
2Y (θ + Y + y) + γ2 − Y 2 +
(
θ2 + θy + δ2
)2
θ2 + δ2 + γ2
)
In P -mode, the firm solves
ΠP∗ = max
t,a,e,I
{
(θ + Y + y) a+ γe+ δI − 1
2
a2 − 1
2
e2 − 1
2
I2
}
subject to
(1− t) θ + y = a
(1− t) γ = e
tδ = I
Straightforward calculations yield
ΠP∗ = max
t
{
1
2
(
((1− t) θ + y) ((1 + t) θ + 2Y + y) + δ2t (2− t) + γ2 (1− t2))}
= max
t
{
1
2
(
(θ + Y + y)2 − (tθ + Y )2 + δ2t (2− t) + γ2 (1− t2))} ,
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which leads to
tP∗ =
δ2 − θY
θ2 + δ2 + γ2
ΠP∗ =
1
2
(
(θ + Y + y)2 + γ2 − Y 2 +
(
δ2 − θY )2
θ2 + δ2 + γ2
)
Comparing the two profits, the P -mode is preferred to the E-mode if and only if
(
(θ + y)2 − Y 2
)
γ2 >
(
(θ + Y )2 − y2
)
δ2.
3.2 Linear revenue function and private benefits proportional to demand
The revenue and cost functions remain the same, but suppose now private benefits are proportional
to the demand underlying the linear revenue function:
Y (a) = Y (θa+ γe+ δI)
y (a) = y (θa+ γe+ δI) ,
where θa+ γe+ δI measures demand and the price is normalized to 1.
In E-mode, the firm solves
ΠE∗ = max
t,a,e,I
{
(1 + Y + y) (θa+ γe+ δI)− 1
2
a2 − 1
2
e2 − 1
2
I2
}
subject to
θ (t+ Y ) = a
γ ((1− t) + y) = e
δ (t+ Y ) = I
Straightforward calculations yield
ΠE∗ = max
t
{
1
2
((
θ2 + δ2
)
(t+ Y ) (2− t+ Y + 2y) + γ2 (1− t+ y) (1 + t+ 2Y + y))} ,
which leads to
tE∗ =
(
θ2 + δ2
)
(1 + y)− γ2Y
θ2 + δ2 + γ2
ΠE∗ =
(1 + Y + y)2
2 (θ2 + δ2 + γ2)2
((
θ2 + δ2
)2 (
θ2 + δ2 + 2γ2
)
+ γ4
(
2θ2 + 2δ2 + γ2
))
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In P -mode, the firm solves
ΠP∗ = max
t,a,e,I
{
(1 + Y + y) (θa+ γe+ δI)− 1
2
a2 − 1
2
e2 − 1
2
I2
}
subject to
θ ((1− t) + y) = a
γ ((1− t) + y) = e
δ (t+ Y ) = I
Straightforward calculations yield
ΠP∗ = max
t
{
1
2
(
δ2 (t+ Y ) (2− t+ Y + 2y) + (θ2 + γ2) (1− t+ y) (1 + t+ 2Y + y))} ,
which leads to
tP∗ =
δ2 (1 + y)− (θ2 + γ2)Y
θ2 + δ2 + γ2
ΠP∗ =
(1 + Y + y)2
2 (θ2 + δ2 + γ2)2
(
δ4
(
2θ2 + δ2 + 2γ2
)
+
(
θ2 + γ2
)2 (
θ2 + 2δ2 + γ2
))
Comparing the two profits, the P -mode dominates the E-mode if and only if
δ4
(
2θ2 + δ2 + 2γ2
)
+
(
θ2 + γ2
)2 (
θ2 + 2δ2 + γ2
)
>
(
θ2 + δ2
)2 (
θ2 + δ2 + 2γ2
)
+ γ4
(
2θ2 + 2δ2 + γ2
)
δ4 +
(
θ2 + γ2
)2
+ δ2
(
θ2 + γ2
)
>
(
θ2 + δ2
)2
+ γ4 +
(
θ2 + δ2
)
γ2
2θ2γ2 + δ2
(
θ2 + γ2
)
> 2θ2δ2 +
(
θ2 + δ2
)
γ2
γ2 > δ2
Thus, with this specification of private benefits, they have no impact on the trade-off between
E-mode and P -mode. This result might seem surprising, particularly in the case when Y > 0 and
y = 0: one would then expect the E-mode to always dominate because the firm takes the private
benefit Y into account when setting a, whereas the agent does not. The reason this is not true is that
in P -mode the firm needs to provide the agent with sufficient incentives for choosing both a and e, so
it sets tP∗ sufficiently low (specifically, 1− tP∗ > tE∗ + Y ) such that it compensates for the fact that
the agent does not internalize the firm’s private Y when setting a.
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4 Cost asymmetries
Consider the linear example with one agent
R (a, e, I) = θa+ γe+ δI
and allow for different costs of the transferable action in the two modes:
caE (a) =
cE
2
a2, caP (a) =
cP
2
a2, ce (e) =
1
2
e2 and cI (I) =
1
2
I2.
Let then2
θE ≡ θ√
cE
and θP ≡ θ√
cP
.
Straightforward calculations lead to
ΠE∗ = max
t
{
1
2
((
θ2E + δ
2
)
t (2− t) + γ2 (1− t2))}
tE∗ =
θ2E + δ
2
θ2E + δ
2 + γ2
and
ΠP∗ = max
t
{
1
2
(
δ2t (2− t) + (θ2P + γ2) (1− t2))}
tP∗ =
δ2
θ2P + δ
2 + γ2
.
Let us determine the effects of γ and δ on the tradeoff between the two modes. Using the envelope
theorem, we obtain
d
(
ΠP∗ −ΠE∗)
d (γ2)
> 0 if and only if tP∗ < tE∗
d
(
ΠP∗ −ΠE∗)
d (δ2)
< 0 if and only if tP∗ < tE∗.
And we have
tE∗ =
θ2E + δ
2
θ2E + δ
2 + γ2
>
δ2
δ2 + γ2
>
δ2
θ2P + δ
2 + γ2
= tP∗.
Therefore, the magnitudes of moral hazard γ and δ have the expected effect on the trade-off.
2We could also allow for the impact θ of the transferable action on revenue to differ depending on mode: θE and θP .
This would have the exact same effect as the difference in cost.
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5 Example with price as transferable decision and linear demand
Recall the revenue function
Ri
(
pi, p−i, ei, I
)
= pi
(
d+ θpi + x
(
p−i − pi
)
+ γei + δI
)
and the assumptions made on parameters in the main paper:
θ < 0, γ > 0, δ > 0
−2θ + min {0, 2x} > max{Nδ2, γ2} . (7)
The fixed costs of agents’ effort and firm’s investment are quadratic:
cei (e) =
1
2
e2, cI (I) =
1
2
I2.
In E-mode, the payoff to agent i from working for the firm is
(1− t)Ri
(
pi, p−i, ei, I
)− 1
2
e2i − T = (1− t) pi
(
d+ θpi + x
(
p−i − pi
)
+ γei + δI
)− 1
2
e2i − T,
which the agent optimizes over ei in the second stage (the fixed fee T is then taken as fixed).
The firm’s payoff in the second stage is
N∑
i=1
(
tpi
(
d+ θpi + x
(
p−i − pi
)
+ γei + δI
))− 1
2
I2,
which the firm optimizes over pi and I.
Evaluating the corresponding first-order conditions at the symmetric equilibrium, we have
−2θpE = d+ γeE + δIE
eE = (1− t) γpE
IE = tNδpE .
Solving, we obtain
pE (t) = d−2θ−(1−t)γ2−tNδ2
eE (t) = d(1−t)γ−2θ−(1−t)γ2−tNδ2
IE (t) = dtNδ−2θ−(1−t)γ2−tNδ2 .
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Note that assumptions (7) ensure pE (t) > 0, eE (t) > 0 and IE (t) > 0.
The fixed fee T is just a transfer that renders each employee indifferent between working for the
firm and their outside option, so the firm’s profit is
ΠE (t) = NpE (t)
(
d+ θpE (t) + γeE (t) + δIE (t)
)−N 1
2
eE (t)2 − 1
2
IE (t)2 .
Plugging in the expressions of pE (t), eE (t) and IE (t) above, we obtain:
ΠE (t) = max
t
Nd
2
(
−2θ − (1− t)2 γ2 − t2Nδ2
)
2 (−2θ − (1− t) γ2 − tNδ2)2
 . (8)
In P -mode, an agent joining the platform chooses (pi, ei) to maximize his second stage payoff
(1− t) pi
(
d+ θpi + x
(
p−i − pi
)
+ γei + δI
)− 1
2
e2i ,
while the firm chooses I to maximize its second stage revenues
N∑
i=1
tpi
(
d+ θpi + x
(
p−i − pi
)
+ γei + δI
)− 1
2
I2.
Evaluating the corresponding first-order conditions at the symmetric equilibrium, we have
(−2θ + x) pP = d+ γeP + δIP
eP = (1− t) γpP
IP = tNδpP .
Solving, we obtain:
pP (t) = d−2θ+x−(1−t)γ2−tNδ2
eP (t) = d(1−t)γ−2θ+x−(1−t)γ2−tNδ2
IP (t) = dtNδ−2θ+x−(1−t)γ2−tNδ2 .
Assumptions (7) ensure pP (t) > 0, eP (t) > 0 and IP (t) > 0.
The fixed fee T renders each agent indifferent between joining the platform and his outside option,
so the firm’s profit in P -mode is
ΠP (t) = NpP (t)
(
d+ θpP (t) + γeP (t) + δIP (t)
)−N 1
2
eP (t)2 − 1
2
IP (t)2 .
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Plugging in the expressions of pP (t), eP (t) and IP (t) above, we obtain:
ΠP (t) = max
t
Nd
2
(
2 (−θ + x)− (1− t)2 γ2 − t2Nδ2
)
2 (−2θ + x− (1− t) γ2 − tNδ2)2
 . (9)
Comparing expressions (8) and (9), ΠE (t) is obtained from ΠP (t) simply by setting x = 0.
Therefore, we will focus on maximizing ΠP (t), from which we can easily derive the maximization of
ΠE (t).
The first-order derivative of ΠP (t) in t is proportional to (with a strictly positive multiplying
factor)
Nδ2 (−2θ + 2x)− γ2x−Nδ2γ2 − t ((Nδ2 + γ2) (−2θ + x)− 2Nδ2γ2) .
Since
(
Nδ2 + γ2
)
(−2θ + x)−2Nδ2γ2 > 0 under assumptions (7), we obtain that the optimal variable
fee under the P -mode is
tP∗ =

0 if Nδ2 (−2θ + 2x)− γ2x−Nδ2γ2 ≤ 0
Nδ2(−2θ+2x)−γ2x−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2+γ2)(−2θ+x)−2Nδ2γ2
if 0 ≤ Nδ2 (−2θ + 2x)− γ2x−Nδ2γ2
≤ (Nδ2 + γ2) (−2θ + x)− 2Nδ2γ2
1
if Nδ2 (−2θ + 2x)− γ2x−Nδ2γ2
≥ (Nδ2 + γ2) (−2θ + x)− 2Nδ2γ2.
Rewriting the conditions:
tP∗ =

0 if x
(
γ2 − 2Nδ2) ≥ Nδ2 (−2θ − γ2)
Nδ2(−2θ+2x)−γ2x−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2+γ2)(−2θ+x)−2Nδ2γ2
if x
(
γ2 − 2Nδ2) ≤ Nδ2 (−2θ − γ2)
and x
(
Nδ2 − 2γ2) ≤ γ2 (−2θ −Nδ2)
1 if x
(
Nδ2 − 2γ2) ≥ γ2 (−2θ −Nδ2) .
Suppose x is such that 0 < tP∗ < 1. Then the first-order condition of ΠP (t) in t evaluated at tP∗
implies:
((
1− tP∗) γ2 − tP∗Nδ2)
 −2θ + x− (1− tP∗) γ2
−tP∗Nδ2
 = (γ2 −Nδ2)
 2 (−θ + x)− (1− tP∗)2 γ2
− (tP∗)2Nδ2
 ,
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from which we can deduce:
ΠP =
Nd2
(
2 (−θ + x)− (1− tP∗)2 γ2 − (tP∗)2Nδ2)
2 (−2θ + x− (1− tP∗) γ2 − tP∗Nδ2)2
=
Nd2
((
1− tP∗) γ2 − tP∗Nδ2)
2 (γ2 −Nδ2) (−2θ + x− (1− tP∗) γ2 − tP∗Nδ2)
=
Nd2
2 (γ2 −Nδ2)
γ2 − tP∗ (Nδ2 + γ2)
−2θ + x− γ2 + tP∗ (γ2 −Nδ2) .
Plugging tP∗ = Nδ
2(−2θ+2x)−γ2x−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2+γ2)(−2θ+x)−2Nδ2γ2 into the last expression, we obtain
ΠP∗ =
Nd2
2
(−2θ + 2x) (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2 + γ2) (−2θ −Nδ2 + x) (−2θ − γ2 + x)− x (Nδ2 − γ2)2 .
From here, we can set x = 0 to obtain
tE∗ =
(−2θ − γ2)Nδ2
−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)− 2Nδ2γ2 ∈ (0, 1)
ΠE∗ =
Nd2
2
−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2 + γ2) (−2θ −Nδ2) (−2θ − γ2) .
The complete characterization of profits in P -mode is:
ΠP∗ =

Nd2
2
2(−θ+x)−γ2
(−2θ+x−γ2)2 if x
(
γ2 − 2Nδ2) ≥ Nδ2 (−2θ − γ2)
Nd2
2
(−2θ+2x)(Nδ2+γ2)−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2+γ2)(−2θ−Nδ2+x)(−2θ−γ2+x)−x(Nδ2−γ2)2
if x
(
γ2 − 2Nδ2) ≤ Nδ2 (−2θ − γ2)
and x
(
Nδ2 − 2γ2) ≤ γ2 (−2θ −Nδ2)
Nd2
2
2(−θ+x)−Nδ2
(−2θ+x−Nδ2)2 if x
(
Nδ2 − 2γ2) ≥ γ2 (−2θ −Nδ2) .
Suppose x
(
γ2 − 2Nδ2) ≤ Nδ2 (−2θ − γ2) and x (Nδ2 − 2γ2) ≤ γ2 (−2θ −Nδ2), so that 0 <
tP∗ < 1. We have ΠP > ΠE if and only if
(−2θ + 2x) (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2 + γ2) (−2θ −Nδ2 + x) (−2θ − γ2 + x)− x (Nδ2 − γ2)2 >
−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2 + γ2) (−2θ −Nδ2) (−2θ − γ2) ,
which is equivalent to
(
(−2θ + 2x) (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2) (Nδ2 + γ2) (−2θ −Nδ2) (−2θ − γ2)
>
(−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2) ((Nδ2 + γ2) (−2θ −Nδ2 + x) (−2θ − γ2 + x)− x (Nδ2 − γ2)2) .
Recall the two sides are equal for x = 0, therefore we can eliminate all terms that are not factored by
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x or x2, so the inequality reduces to
2x
(
Nδ2 + γ2
)2 (−2θ −Nδ2) (−2θ − γ2)
>
(−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2) (−x (Nδ2 − γ2)2 + x (Nδ2 + γ2) (−4θ − (Nδ2 + γ2))+ x2 (Nδ2 + γ2)) .
Rearranging, this can be rewritten
0 > −x
 (−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2) (2 (N2δ4 + γ4)+ 4θ (Nδ2 + γ2))
+2
(
Nδ2 + γ2
)2 (−2θ −Nδ2) (−2θ − γ2)
+
+x2
(−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2) (Nδ2 + γ2) .
Simplifying, this leads to
0 > −2xNδ2γ2 (2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)+ 2Nδ2γ2)+ x2 (−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2) (Nδ2 + γ2) ,
from which we conclude
ΠP∗ > ΠE∗ ⇐⇒ x
(
2Nδ2γ2
(−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)− 2Nδ2γ2)
(−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2) (Nδ2 + γ2) + x
)
< 0.
Both the numerator and the denominator of the large fraction are positive under assumptions (7).
We conclude that when 0 < tP∗ < 1:
ΠP∗ > ΠE∗ ⇐⇒ − 2Nδ
2γ2
(−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)− 2Nδ2γ2)
(−2θ (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2) (Nδ2 + γ2) < x < 0
⇐⇒
−4
(
θNδ
2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
+ 1
)
Nδ2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
(
2θNδ
2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
+ 1
) < x < 0.
It remains to consider the cases x
(
γ2 − 2Nδ2) ≥ Nδ2 (−2θ − γ2) (in which tP∗ = 0) and x (Nδ2 − 2γ2) ≥
γ2
(−2θ −Nδ2) (in which tP∗ = 1). It is easier to consider the following three cases in turn.
Case I: γ2 > 2Nδ2.
In this case, it is easily verified that assumptions (7) imply x
(
Nδ2 − 2γ2) ≤ γ2 (−2θ −Nδ2).
Therefore we have:
ΠP∗ =

Nd2
2
2(−θ+x)−γ2
(−2θ+x−γ2)2 if x ≥
Nδ2(−2θ−γ2)
γ2−2Nδ2
Nd2
2
(−2θ+2x)(Nδ2+γ2)−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2+γ2)(−2θ−Nδ2+x)(−2θ−γ2+x)−x(Nδ2−γ2)2 if
Nδ2(−2θ−γ2)
γ2−2Nδ2 ≥ x ≥ −
−2θ−max{γ2,Nδ2}
2 .
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The expression 2(−θ+x)−γ
2
(−2θ+x−γ2)2 is increasing in x for x ≤ 0 and decreasing in x for x ≥ 0, therefore
the maximum value attained by ΠP when x ≥ Nδ
2(−2θ−γ2)
γ2−2Nδ2 is precisely when x =
Nδ2(−2θ−γ2)
γ2−2Nδ2 . That
value is:
ΠP∗
(
x =
Nδ2
(−2θ − γ2)
γ2 − 2Nδ2
)
=
Nd2
2
γ2
(
γ2 − 2Nδ2)
(−2θ − γ2) (γ2 −Nδ2)2
<
Nd2
2
(−2θ) (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2 + γ2) (−2θ −Nδ2) (−2θ − γ2) = Π
E∗,
where the inequality is straightforward to verify under assumptions (7). Thus, ΠE∗ dominates ΠP∗
for all x ≥ Nδ
2(−2θ−γ2)
γ2−2Nδ2 . Combining with the result above, we conclude that Π
E∗ dominates ΠP∗ for
all x ≥ 0 and x ≤
−4
(
θNδ
2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
+1
)
Nδ2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
(
2θNδ
2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
+1
) , whereas ΠP∗ dominates ΠE∗ for all permissible x such that
−4
(
θNδ
2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
+ 1
)
Nδ2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
(
2θNδ
2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
+ 1
) ≤ x ≤ 0.
Case II: Nδ2 > 2γ2.
In this case, it is easily verified that assumptions (7) imply x
(
γ2 − 2Nδ2) ≤ Nδ2 (−2θ − γ2).
Therefore we have:
ΠP∗ =

Nd2
2
2(−θ+x)−Nδ2
(−2θ+x−Nδ2)2 if x ≥
γ2(−2θ−Nδ2)
Nδ2−2γ2
Nd2
2
(−2θ+2x)(Nδ2+γ2)−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2+γ2)(−2θ−Nδ2+x)(−2θ−γ2+x)−x(Nδ2−γ2)2 if
γ2(−2θ−Nδ2)
Nδ2−2γ2 ≥ x ≥ −
−2θ−max{γ2,Nδ2}
2 .
The analysis is exactly the same as in Case I above (by symmetry in γ2 and Nδ2), therefore the
conclusion is exactly the same for this case as well.
Case III: γ2 ≤ 2Nδ2 and Nδ2 ≤ 2γ2.
In this case, it is easily verified that assumptions (7) imply x
(
Nδ2 − 2γ2) ≤ γ2 (−2θ −Nδ2) and
x
(
γ2 − 2Nδ2) ≤ Nδ2 (−2θ − γ2) for all permissible x. Therefore we have:
ΠP∗ =
Nd2
2
(−2θ + 2x) (Nδ2 + γ2)−Nδ2γ2
(Nδ2 + γ2) (−2θ −Nδ2 + x) (−2θ − γ2 + x)− x (Nδ2 − γ2)2
20
for all permissible x, so we already know that
ΠP∗ > ΠE∗ ⇐⇒
−4
(
θNδ
2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
+ 1
)
Nδ2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
(
2θNδ
2+γ2
Nδ2γ2
+ 1
) < x < 0.
6 Hybrid mode across agents
Recall the expression of firm profits when using a hybrid mode as a function of
(
tE , tP , n
)
:
ΠH
(
tE , tP , n
)
= n
 tE (2− tE) θ2
2
+
(
1− (tE)2) γ2
2
+ (N − n)

(
1− (tP )2) θ2
2
+
(
1− (tP )2) γ2
2

+
t
(
2− t)N2δ2
2
,
where
t ≡ n
N
tE +
N − n
N
tP .
Optimizing over the three variables
(
tE , tP , n
)
yields the following first-order conditions (assuming
interior solution in all three variables):
θ2 +Nδ2 − (θ2 + γ2 + nδ2) tE − (N − n) δ2tP = 0
Nδ2 − nδ2tE − (θ2 + γ2 + (N − n) δ2) tP = 0
θ2
2
(
tE
(
2− tE)− 1 + (tP )2)+ γ22 ((tP )2 − (tE)2)+Nδ2 (1− t) (tE − tP ) = 0.
Solving the first two first-order conditions above for
(
tE , tP
)
as functions of n, we obtain:
tE =
(θ2+Nδ2)(θ2+γ2)+(N−n)δ2θ2
(θ2+γ2)(θ2+γ2+Nδ2)
tP = (N−n)δ
2θ2+Nδ2γ2
(θ2+γ2)(θ2+γ2+Nδ2)
.
This implies:
tE − tP = θ2
θ2+γ2
N
(
1− t) = (N−n)θ2+Nγ2
θ2+γ2+Nδ2
.
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We can now plug these expressions in the third first-order condition above, which becomes:
θ2
2
(
tE
(
2− tE)− 1 + (tP )2)+ γ2
2
((
tP
)2 − (tE)2)+ θ2δ2
θ2 + γ2
(N − n) θ2 +Nγ2
θ2 + γ2 +Nδ2
= 0
θ2
2
(
2tE − 1)− θ2 + γ2
2
θ2
θ2 + γ2
(
tE + tP
)
+
θ2δ2
θ2 + γ2
(N − n) θ2 +Nγ2
θ2 + γ2 +Nδ2
= 0
1
2
(
tE − tP − 1)+ δ2
θ2 + γ2
(N − n) θ2 +Nγ2
θ2 + γ2 +Nδ2
= 0
− γ
2
2 (θ2 + γ2)
+
δ2
θ2 + γ2
(N − n) θ2 +Nγ2
θ2 + γ2 +Nδ2
= 0.
The last expression is decreasing in n, which means the second-order condition is satisfied.
Solving for n yields
n∗ = N
(
1− γ
2
(
θ2 + γ2 −Nδ2)
2Nδ2θ2
)
.
This solution is valid if and only if
0 < γ2
(
θ2 + γ2 −Nδ2) < 2Nδ2θ2,
i.e. if and only if
θ2 + γ2 > Nδ2 > γ2 − θ
2γ2
2θ2 + γ2
.
If Nδ2 > θ2 + γ2 then n∗ = N (pure E-mode is optimal) and if Nδ2 < γ2 − θ2γ2
2θ2+γ2
then n∗ = 0
(pure P -mode is optimal). Note that γ2 − θ2γ2
2θ2+γ2
is increasing in γ2.
7 Robustness of Corollary 1 to private benefits and spillovers
Corollary 1 in Section 4.3 of the main paper implies that if t∗ < 1/2 then the P -mode is optimal and
if t∗ > 1/2 then the E-mode is optimal. We wish to investigate the extent to which this prediction
still holds for the linear demand example once we add private benefits or spillovers.
7.1 Private benefits
Using the linear demand example, for any set of parameter values, we can calculate the optimal choice
of model and the t∗ corresponding to the optimal mode. The following parameters need to be specified:
θ, δ, γ, y and Y . We normalize θ = 1 throughout. We proceed in three steps:
• For a given value of δ2, set y = Y = 0 and build the set of values of γ2 such that tE∗ varies from
0.01 to 0.99 in increments of 0.01.
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• For each value of γ2 in the set defined in the previous step, consider 100 equally spaced values of
y from 0 to γ2 and 100 equally spaced values of Y from 0 to δ2. This range of y and Y ensures
that
(
tE∗, tP∗
) ∈ [0, 1]2.
• Repeat the previous two steps for a range of different δ2 as reported in Table 1 below. For each
value of δ2, record the average values of tE∗ and tP∗ across all 990, 000 observations of
(
γ2, y, Y
)
defined in the previous steps and the fraction of these observations for which the prediction of
Corollary 1 is true.
Table 1
δ2 0.5 1 2 5 10 100
tP∗ 0.066 0.094 0.123 0.157 0.177 0.205
tE∗ 0.860 0.800 0.751 0.716 0.704 0.690
% of obs. theory true 100% 98.9% 96.0% 91.2% 88.5% 85.2%
The higher the percentage of observations for which the prediction of Corollary 1 is true, the more
confident we can be in using the observed commissions received by agents (or variable fees charged to
agents) to infer which mode the firm operates in. Specifically, if we observe agents keeping more than
50% of variable revenues, then the firm is most likely to be using P -mode; if we observe agents keep
less than 50% of variable revenues, then the firm is most likely using the E-mode. The values in Table
1 make it clear that this inference is remarkably accurate for low values of δ2.
7.2 Spillovers
With spillovers rather than private benefits, we have the additional parameter x but no longer have
the parameters y and Y . Also the parameter δ2 becomes Nδ2. The procedure is similar to the case
with private benefits.
We normalize θ = 1 throughout. We proceed in two steps:
• For a given value of Nδ2, build the set of values of γ2 such that tE∗ varies from 0.01 to 0.99 in
0.01 intervals (recall that tE∗ does not depend on x), and the set of values of x from −0.99 to
0.33 in 0.01 intervals (this is the range of spillovers such that the cross-effect of the transferable
action is less than half as important in magnitude as the own effect of the transferable action).3
3Given that the own effect is θ− x, the cross-effect is x and θ = 1, this condition requires x < 1
2
(1− x) for x > 0 and
|x| < 1
2
(1 + |x|) for x < 0, which is equivalent to −1 < x < 1
3
.
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• Repeat the previous step for a range of different Nδ2 as reported in Table 2 below. For each
value of Nδ2, record the average values of tE∗ and tP∗ across all 13, 167 observations of
(
γ2, x
)
defined in the previous step and the fraction of these observations for which the prediction of
Corollary 1 is true.
Table 2
Nδ2 0.5 1 2 5 10 100
tP∗ 0.213 0.238 0.257 0.273 0.280 0.286
tE∗ 0.883 0.848 0.818 0.793 0.782 0.771
% of obs. theory true 99.2% 98.2% 96.6% 94.3% 93.1% 92.1%
The results in Table 2 are qualitatively the same as those in Table 1.
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